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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Report on Audio Countermeasures

1. Although we are appreciative of the recommendations for increase in personnel and equipment which we do need, we cannot concur in several of [REDACTED] conclusions and must comment on certain ones of them rather critically. In many places he presents his own speculation or conjecture as fact or as "inescapable conclusions." Not only are many of the statements redundant but he makes in addition statements elsewhere in the report which are contradictory. The heavy repetition of these statements throughout the document, unsupported by specific fact because none exists, only confuses the reader. This extremist position does a disservice because we are dealing with in a field that is complex enough to understand. These are some examples:

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a. Page 2, paragraph E

[REDACTED]


He presents no facts to support the first statement because there are none he can cite and he, in effect, admits this in his second statement. The wording on this allegation of his and in similar ones is tricky and the reader only comes away confused because he cannot determine which is fact and which is not.

b. Page 3, paragraph F

"...the dangers inherent are compounded by serious security weaknesses in most U. S. installations..."

Specifically what he doesn't say. It would be helpful to know because he adds "...these dangers are only compounded further" etc. A statement like this unsupported by fact is a disservice.

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
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c. Page 6, paragraph 1, last sentence

This long rambling sentence with his final conclusion, unsupported with any specifics, again does a disservice for the Agency.

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d. Page 6, paragraph 3



He neither lists the specific surveillance systems of the enemy he has in mind nor matches them with any program in which we are deficient. We, therefore, can take no corrective action of any sort.

e. Page 6, last sentence

We can only repeat here what we have said before: this wording is tricky; and he gives no specific facts to support his speculation presented as fact.

f. Page 8, paragraph 2, last sentence

Where specifically does he think this has happened? What are the facts to back this up? These sorts of specifics would be needed to take any action on such an allegation.

g. Page 9, paragraph 1, next to last sentence

He gives no specific reasons to support this speculation, therefore, no constructive action could be taken to correct any deficiencies he conjectures may exist.

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Survey of Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures

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Regarding [REDACTED] recommendations, we have the following comments:

a. Recommendations No. 1 and No. 2 are inherently important if the Technical Division is to afford the technical security to Agency assets both domestic and abroad. In reference to Recommendation No. 2, an important addition beyond funding is the availability of state-of-the-art equipment against which funds are to be expended. As you are aware,


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3. b. We feel strongly that there is a need for a central countermeasures training facility to serve the USIB Community. Further, we feel that the Agency is best equipped to serve as an Executive Agent in the development of such a program. Under current manpower and budgetary restrictions, the Technical Division of the Office of Security cannot undertake this added responsibility without additional personnel and funds. Our position in this respect is known to the Deputy Director for Support.

c. There is no problem with Recommendation No. 4, other than assurances that the Office of Security would continue to obtain the CI-type information from [REDACTED] 25X1A

d. Recommendations No. 5 and No. 6 pertain to the same over-all problem. We gather [REDACTED] includes all business machine (emanations) security in the Office of Communications package. If so, this removes the Office of Security from an area of current concern. We personally feel in agreement with these [REDACTED] recommendations as Technical Division responsibility in this area would require substantial and large outlays in terms of money and personnel. These assets would better be utilized for operational 25X1A

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


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countermeasures efforts. We feel, however, we should keep an oar in this part of technical security as a junior partner with the Office of Communications. Our conclusion in this recommendation presupposes that the Office of Communications will keep us fully informed of their activities in this area, particularly where it may impinge on our physical security responsibilities.

e. We feel Recommendation No. 7 is a good approach to a large problem, however, would include representation for Chief, Physical Security Division, inasmuch as security equipment is involved in the matters to be considered by the proposed working group.


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g. Recommendations Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 appear at first blush to be satisfactory. They do bespeak a concept of maximum technical security which may not be obtainable under realistic circumstances.

h. Regarding Recommendation No. 15, we feel that

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


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i. There appears to be no problem with Recommendations Nos. 16, 17, and 18.

j. Recommendation No. 19 is a large and important one from the Office of Security/Technical Division standpoint. It involves philosophies and concepts, and we feel a questionable assumption on [REDACTED] part that our technical inspections are routinely handled in a cursory manner; this we disagree with completely. Complete coverage and/or demolition as necessary is the only way to strengthen assurances that installations are free of technical compromise. This recommendation involves positions regarding personnel, equipment, and money.

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k. Whereas there is some merit in Recommendation No. 20, documentation and cover considerations make this extremely difficult, if not impossible. An effort to work under this recommendation could involve an expenditure of time and personnel assets above and beyond what is possible. These procedures might be considered for an individual country situation, but they cannot be applied with equal impact in all world areas. Recommendation No. 21 is essentially a part of [REDACTED] concern in Recommendation No. 20.

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l. Recommendations Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 basically involve Office of Security/Technical Division policy determinations with which there seems no basic disagreement, manpower permitting. In substance, they are indicative of good operational planning and management.

m. Recommendation No. 28 should be satisfied if the working group under Recommendation No. 7 is established.

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n. There is no disagreement from this quarter with respect to Recommendations Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33. Subject matter in these recommendations have been covered or are indicated under previous recommendations made. They again, in some cases, indicate a maximum security approach which is good if properly tempered with operational requirements. Thus, they are not doctrine to be set out in this short group of words.

o. The Office of Security would want to be a coordination point under the dissemination of this report as recommended in Recommendations No. 34 and No. 35. Certainly the field must be advised as many of the recommendations, if implemented, would directly involve their installations and activities.

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